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Abstract
We study a mathematical model for revenue management under competition
with multiple sellers. The model combines the stochastic knapsack problem,
a classic revenue management model, with a non coorperative game model
that characterizes the sellers’ rational behavior. We are able to establish a
dynamic recursive procedure that incorporate the value function with the
utility function of the games. The formalization of the dynamic recursion
allows us to establish some fundamental structural properties.
1. Introduction
A key model in revenue (yield) management is the following, a seller
needs to sell a fixed amount of certain commodity before a fixed deadline to
different buyers with individual price they are willing to pay, and the seller
can dynamically adjust the selling price to maximize his/her overall revenue
over time. Stochastic knapsack problem, also known as stochastic dynamic
knapsack problem, a mathematical problem that captures the essences of this
model, quantifies some of the most fundamental trade-offs in revenue man-
agement, and serves as an important building block for more complex and
sophisticated models for real life applications. Consequently, the stochastic
(dynamic) knapsack problem and its variations have been studied extensively,
see, e.g. [7], [1], [3], [10], [4], [5], [11], [12], [8]. It is one of the fundamental
models surveyed by Anould de Boer in [2], please refer to that paper for more
details, as well as references.
It is natural to ask the question of what would happen if there are mul-
tiple sellers competing for the same demand stream from the buyers. In this
paper, we generalize the classic stochastic knapsack problem, and formulate
a mathematical model to capture the basic relations in this situation. An
Preprint submitted to Operations Research Letters Receive
immediate goal is to formulate a dynamic recursion for calculating the opti-
mal policies for sellers. In the single seller case, this is accomplished through
the formulation of a dynamic program that computes the maximum expected
revenue starting at any time with any amount of remaining inventory. How-
ever, in the case of multiple sellers, at each time period, the sellers’ decisions
are inter-dependent. It is, therefore, not a trivial task to decide what will be
the next best action even if every seller has the same forecast of the future
demand arrivals. Another difficulty is that when multiple sellers are willing
to sell the product, the buyer can have different ways to choose one of them
to fulfill the demand, the difference in these selection rules has significant
impact on the evolution of the system. To overcome these difficulties, we
model the sellers as rational individual or institutions, and introduce a non-
cooperative game at each step of the dynamic recursion characterizing their
behavior. Furthermore, we follow a static probabilistic selection rule, which
will be described precisely later, that the buyer will use to select sellers.
This selection rule, on one hand, reflects market power of the sellers, on the
other hand, it allows the uncertainty that is natural in business reality. With
this mechanism, the utility functions of the games are properly connected
with the value functions of the dynamic recursion, thus help to identify pure
strategy Nash equilibriums. Under the selection rule assumed, we are able to
demonstrate that there is a unique Nash equilibrium of the game. In turn,
assuming that the Nash equilibriums will be the strategy followed by all the
sellers at each step, the dynamic recursion is able to proceed. Once estab-
lishing the dynamic recursion, we are able to extend the arguments that are
effective for the single seller dynamic programming, and demonstrate that, in
some cases, the value function exhibits remarkable rich monotonicity proper-
ties that provide insights to key trade-offs to the problem and can be helpful
to dynamic pricing in practice. A related but different model is considered
in [6], it is concluded that, under a differential game setting, the equilibrium
structure enjoys simple structural properties. While the model studied here
is quite different, but results are similar in spirit.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follow. In Sec. 2, we will in-
troduce the basic mathematical models, and review preliminaries including
some basic concepts in game theorety that will be needed for our analysis.
In Sec. 3, we will discuss in details the dynamic recursion in which the game
aspect of the problem is incorporated. In Sec. 4, we establish some funda-
mental structural properties of the value functions of the dynamic recursion.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. 5 with a summary of our findings.
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2. Models and Preliminaries
2.1. Model Descriptions
Suppose that there are N sellers, and each seller n, n = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
has an initial inventory of Cn units of product ( could be either goods or
services) at the beginning of a common selling horizon. The selling horizon
is discrete and of length T < ∞. At each time t = 1, 2, . . . , T , demand for
one unit of the product will emerge, and the buyer will post a price that
he/she is willing to pay. To accommodate the event of no arrival, we can
always include a class of demand with exceedingly low price. The sellers who
have positive inventory need to decide whether they should accept or reject
this demand. The buyer will then select one seller among all the sellers that
accept the demand according to certain selection rule, and the selected seller
will supply the product and collect the revenue. At the end of the selling
horizon, all the remaining product will be savaged. The goal for each seller
is to maximize his/her expected revenue.
We assume that each seller does not have the information of the exact
value of the initial inventory of other sellers, but has a distributional estima-
tion of that quantity. We also assume that the distributional information of
the future demand price is given to each seller, and no seller has any extra
knowledge. In particular, we assume that the price of the demand realiza-
tion at each period follow an independent and identically distributed discrete
probability distribution P , with P[P = pi] = θi, i = 1, 2, . . . , I.
Suppose that, at each time t, when the demand is of class i, i,e. the price
is pi, a subset of sellers, denoted by At(i) (which can be shortened to At
when there is no ambiguity), will accept the demand, decided based on the
remaining time, demand type, remaining inventory and the selling history
up to time t. The buyer will select only one seller among them, which means
that there is a possibility that no seller is selected. There could be various
selection rule models reflecting different market mechanisms, for example, a
static rule ( the buyer chooses one product over the other overwhelmingly,
which happens often in some local and monopoly market) and weighted rule
(buyer assigns weights to the each product, then randomly, with probabilities
determined by the weights, select ones that are available). In this paper, we
will focus on a random allocation rule with static probabilities: each seller
is associated with a probability pin,
∑N
n=1 pin = 1. At each time, if a seller
accepts, the probability of it being selected is always pin, and with probability
1−
∑
n∈At(i)
pin, no one is selected.
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At each time t, the phenomenon that the sellers are making independent
decisions based on distributional information on the other sellers can be best
modeled by a non coorperative strategic game, see, e.g. [9].
3. A Dynamic Recursion Formulation
Our goal is to identify a strategy for a seller to achieve the best outcome,
in terms of average revenue, under a reasonable assumption on other sellers’
behavior. Recall that each seller n, n = 1, 2, . . . , N with initial inventory
Cn is also given the distributional information of the inventory of all other
sellers, either though statistical forecast or other business information in-
quiry, and any two sellers will be given the exact same distribution on the
third seller. In addition, all the sellers do observe all the sells outcomes up
to each decision time epoch, i.e. they know the amount each seller sold so
far. It is our intention to derive a dynamic recursion for calculating the
best outcome, hence the optimal strategy for each seller. Equivalently, given
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN) representing the amount of inventory has been sold so far
by each seller, we seek to calculate vn(t, dn, s), n = 1, 2, . . . , N , the maximum
expected revenue seller n can collect starting from time t and with remaining
inventory dn, for any time t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
We assume that the behavior of the sellers is modeled as a N -person
game, and if sellers follow the Nash Equilibriums at each time period, a
dynamic recursion can proceed. This will be argued inductively. At the last
time period T , given a price realization, pi, there are two strategies for each
seller, accept or reject. The utility function of the game for seller n will be
the expected revenue collected by taking either action. If reject, of course,
there is no revenue. It is clear that, if the random selection rule with static
probabilities is followed, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, that is, every
seller will accept, as long as they have a positive inventory. In this case, the
value function vn(T,d) has the following form, vn(T,d) = pinE[P ], where pin
are the probabilities in the section rule model.
Now, suppose that we can calculate recursively all the value function
vn(t + 1, dn, s) for any feasible s, we demonstrate that there exists a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium at time period t, and show how it is related
to the calculation of the value function for time t, vn(t, dn, s). There are
two actions for each seller, accept or reject. The payoff function will be
the expected revenue to be collected until time T . Therefore, the seller
will consider the following balance inequality, whose left hand side (LHS)
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represents the price we get immediately, and right hand side (RHS) represents
the future reward,
p ≥ En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)− vn(t+ 1, dn − 1, s+ en)], (3.1)
where En,t is the expectation with respect to the information available at time
t for seller n, p the generic price the class indicator is suppressed when there
is no ambiguity). If (3.1) holds, then the order will be accepted. Otherwise,
if we have,
p < En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)− vn(t+ 1, dn − 1, s+ en)], (3.2)
the order will be rejected.
Remark The operator En,t can be treated in a way as an conditional expec-
tation, the information update each time is basically the confirmation that
the random variable of each seller’s inventory is larger than the cumulative
sales, which is updated at the end of each time period.
Proposition 1. The above defined strategy is a unique Nash Equilibrium.
Proof To prove that it is a Nash Equilibrium, let us discuss separately for
those sellers depends upon their decisions. Suppose that for a particular
seller n, the action is to accept, three events can happen,
• sell n is selected, with probability pin;
• some other seller j in At is selected, with probability pij ;
• no seller is selected, with probability 1−
∑
At
pii.
Sum them up, the pay-off function has the following form,
pinEn,t[p+ vn(t+ 1, dn − 1, s)] +
∑
j 6=n,j∈At
pijEn,t[vn(t + 1, dn, s+ ej)]
+
(
1−
∑
At
pii
)
En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)].
If seller n deviates from the strategy, i.e., rejects the demand, its payoff will
be,
∑
j 6=n,j∈At
pijEn,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s+ ej)] +

1− ∑
At−{n}
pii

En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)].
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From the (3.1), we know that seller n could not be better off.
In the case seller n reject, the pay off is,
∑
j 6=n,j∈At
pijEn,t[vn(t + 1, dn, s+ ej)] +

1− ∑
At−{n}
pii

En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s+ ej)].
If the seller deviates from this strategy, the pay-off will become,
pin[p+ En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn − 1, s)]] +
∑
j 6=n,j∈At
pijEn,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s+ ej)]
+
(
1−
∑
At
pii
)
En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)].
However, we know that p + En,t[vn(t + 1, dn − 1, s)] < En,t[vn(t + 1, dn, s)],
therefore, the seller will be worse off.
Suppose any other strategy that has a seller n, such that, p+vn(t+1, dn−
1, s+ en) < vn(t+ 1, dns), but seller n accepts the demand. We can see that
deviation will lead to better pay-off. Meanwhile if there is a seller n with
p+ vn(t+ 1, dn− 1, s+ en) ≥ vn(t+ 1, dn, s), but seller n rejects, a deviation
will lead to higher pay-off. 
The above arguments allow us to present the following dynamic recursion
for the value function,
vn(t, dn, s) =
I∑
i=1
θiwn(t + 1, dn, s, pi), (3.3)
wn(t + 1, dn, s, pi) =
(
1−
N∑
m=1
pim
)
En,t[vn(t + 1, dn, s)]
+ pipin1 {En,t[vn(t + 1, dn − 1, s+ en) + pi] ≥ En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)]}
+
N∑
m=1
pim[vn(t + 1, dn, s+ em)1{Em,t[vm(t+ 1, dm − 1, s+ em) + pi] ≥ Em,t[vm(t+ 1, dm)]}
+ En,t[vn(t + 1, dn + s)1{En,t[vn(t + 1, dn − 1, s+ en) + pi < vn(t+ 1, dn, s)]}],
(3.4)
vN(T, dn, s) = piNE[p]. (3.5)
Remark The information available at time t is on the distribution on the
initial capacity of all the other sellers, as well as the sales records in the past
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period. At time t+1, the sales records will be amended with what happened
during time period t, the distribution inform hence is naturally updated, for
example, if the original distributional estimation is D, and at time t, the total
sales has been s, then that information should be updated to D;D ≥ s. At
time t, if there are sales by that seller, it should be updated to D;D ≥ s+1,
otherwise, it will stay at D;D ≥ s.
4. Monotonicity of the Value Functions and its Implications in
Revenue Management
In this section, we will establish monotonicity properties of the value
function vn(t, d, s), based on the dynamic recursion formulated in Sec. 3.
The main result is stated in the following theorem, and its proof is presented
in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Under the random selection rule with static probabilities, the
value function of the knapsack problem vn(t, d, s) for the n-th seller satisfies
the following monotonicity properties.
(1) Monotone in inventory d, i.e. En,t−1[vn(t, dn, s) ≥ En,t−1[vn(t, dn −
1, s)];
(2) Monotone in selling amount of competitors,
En,t−1[vn(t, dn, s)] ≤ En,t−1[vn(t, dn, s+ ei)];
(3) Monotone in time t, i.e. En,t−1[vn(t, dn, s)] ≥ En,t[vn(t+ 1, dn, s)]
(4) ”Concave” in dn, i.e.,
En,t−1[vn(t, d, s)− vn(t, dn − 1, s+ en)]
≥En,t−1[vn(t, dn + 1, s)− vn(t, d, s+ en)]; (4.1)
(5) Submodular in (t,d), i.e.,
En,t−1[vn(t, d, s)]− En,t−1[vn(t, d, s+ en)]
≥ En,t[vn(t+ 1, d, s)]− En,t[vn(t+ 1, d, s+ en)]. (4.2)
7
(6) Submodular in d, i.e.
En,t−1[vn(t, d, s)]− En,t−1[vn(t, d, s+ en)]
≥ En,t−1[vn(t, d, s− em)] + En,t−1[vn(t, d, s+ en − em)], (4.3)
with m 6= n.
Recall that we raised several questions in the introduction, here, after the
statement of the main monotonicity results, we need to use them to answer
some of those questions.
From (2) of Theorem 2, we can immediately see that,
Proposition 3. For each individual seller, his/her total average revenue is
a monotone decrease function of his/her competitors inventory surplus levels.
Remark It is apparent that the more the overall supply is, the less is the
expected marginal gain for each individual unit.
From (4), i.e. ”concave in inventory” of Theorem 2, we can conclude that
Proposition 4. If it is optimal to accept the at certain point, then it is also
optimal to accept when your competitors have more inventory.
Remark The intuition is that when there are more inventory in the hands
of the competitors, they will be more aggressive, and it will then lower your
expected marginal gain. Thus, you will be more likely to accept a lower price.
The inequality in (6) tells us that
Proposition 5. A lower selling amount of his/her competitors will make a
seller less likely to accept a fixed price; certainly, a higher selling amount will
make the same seller more likely to accept the same price.
Intuitively, observing more sells from ones competitors will make a seller
more aggressive.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the classic stochastic knapsack problem to model
competitions between several sellers and effects on their dynamic pricing
decisions. By utilizing dynamic programming techniques, together with a
game theoretical model on the sellers’ behavior, we are able to identify a
simple strategy, i.e. checking the balance inequality, for each seller, and a
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dynamic recursion for calculating the value functions required. Furthermore,
we show that the value functions have several important first and second
order monotonicity properties that are of important theoretical values and
critical practical implications.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof It is easy to see that (1) and (3) are trivial. We will prove the rest by
backward induction on time t. First, it is trivial to check all of them at the
end of selling season, time T . Next, suppose that at time period t + 1 and
later, the properties (2) and(4) through (6) hold. We want to extend all the
result to time period t. Since selection is based on the static probabilities, to
facilitate our discussion, denote Π0 the event that no seller is selected, and
Πi, i = 1, . . . , N the event that seller i is selected. From our assumptions, it is
clear that the probabilities of these events are pii, i = 0, 1, . . . , N , respectively.
Furthermore, since all the demand random variables are i.i.d, it is suffice to
focus on the event that the price of the demand is pi, i = 1, . . . , N . We will
use a generic notation p to denote the price, for the ease of exposition.
Validity of (2)
Recall that, we need to establish Ei,t−1[vi(t, di, s)] ≤ Ei,t−1[vi(t, di, s+ej)],
for j 6= i. Without loss of generality, it suffices to show, E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s)] ≤
E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s+ ej)], for any j > 1. We will argue that the inequality holds
on each event Πi, i = 0, 1, . . . , N . On Π0, since no seller is selected, it is easy
to see that the inequality holds by induction, and the induction arguments
also applies to Πi, i 6= 1 and i 6= j. On Π1, examine what happens at time t,
the only case that is not straightforward is that seller one only accept given
that the history is s but reject when it is s+ej . In this case, the left hand side
(LHS) of the inequality becomes E1,t[v1(t+1, d1−1, s+e1)]+p. By induction,
it is less than or equal to E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1 − 1, s + e1 + ej)] + p. Meanwhile,
E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1 − 1, s + ej + e1))] + p ≤ E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1, s + ej)] due to the
fact that this demand is not accepted when the history is s+ ej. Hence, the
inequality follows. On Πj , j > 1, there are two cases need to be considered
depending on whether seller j accepts the demand. Case I, seller j only
accepts when the history is s not when it is s+ej. In this case, we have both
the LHS and the right hand side (RHS) equal to E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1, s + ej)].
Case II, seller j accepts in both cases. Then, the desired inequality is a
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consequence of E1,t[v1(t+ 1, d1, s+ e1)] ≤ E1,t[v1(t+ 1, d1, s+ 2e1)], which is
the consequence of induction.
Validity of (4)
Without loss of generality, we only need to show,
E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s)]− E1,t−1[v1(t, d1 − 1, s+ e1)]
≥E1,t−1[v1(t, d1 + 1, s)]− E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s+ e1)].
Let us first consider case by case based on whether demand will be accepted
by seller one. From the induction assumption for time t + 1, we know that
there are only the following cases,
I. the demand is only accepted when the inventory is at d1 + 1 not when
it is d1;
II. the demand is accepted when the inventory levels are at both d1 + 1
and d1;
III. the demand is rejected in either case.
And we will discuss each case for events Π0,Π1 and Πj , j > 1.
In Case I, on event Π0, the inequality follows from induction, i.e. the
concavity with respect to the inventory, at time t+ 1. On the event Π1, the
LHS becomes E1,t[v1(t+1, d1, s)−v1(t+1, d1−1, s+e1)], and the RHS becomes
p, then the inequality follows because the balance inequality is violated, which
is exactly the reason the demand is not accepted when the inventory is at
(d1, s). On Πj , j ≥ 2, since the decision of seller j will not depend on the
actual amount of inventory seller one has, but just the distribution, the RHS
becomes, E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1 + 1, s+ ej)− v1(t + 1, d1, s+ ej + e1)]. Hence, the
inequality will follow from the concavity with respect to inventory from time
t+ 1 due to induction assumption.
In Case II, again, we only need to look at event Π1, where the LHS
becomes p and the RHS becomes E1,t[v1(t+1, d1, s)−v1(t+1, d1−1, s+e1)],
and the inequality follows from the balance inequality. Finally, in Case III,
the inequality follows from induction.
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Validity of (5)
Again, we need to show that,
E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s)]− E1,t−1[v1(t, d1 − 1, s+ e1)]
≥E1,t−1[v1(t+ 1, d1, s)]− E1,t−1[v1(t+ 1, d1 − 1, s+ e1)].
We will examine the inequality on each event Πi, i=0,1, . . . , N. On Π0, the
inequality follows directly from the induction assumption. On Π1, let us
consider three subcases. First, it is again a straightforward conclusion from
the induction assumption if the demand is not accepted for either inventory
level. On the other hand if it is accepted for both inventory levels, then the
inequality holds due to the induction assumption on the validity of (4) at
time t and t+ 1. If seller one only accepts when the inventory level is at d1,
but not when it is at d1−1, the LHS will become p, then by the condition of
accept, i.e. the balance inequality, it is larger than the RHS. On Πj , j ≥ 2,
the inequality follows from the induction assumption on (6) if the demand is
accepted for both inventory levels. By the distributional assumption, that is
all that needs to be considered.
Validity of (6)
It is our task to show that, for j ≥ 2,
E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s)]− E1,t−1[v1(t, d1 − 1, s+ e1)]
≥ E1,t−1[v1(t, d1, s− ej)]− E1,t−1[v1(t, d1 − 1, s− ej + e1)].
On the event Π1, we know that, by induction assumption, we only need to
consider the case that the seller one accepts the demand when the inventory
level is at d1, but not when it is at d1 − 1. In this case, the LHS becomes
p. For the RHS, consider the two cases that seller one accepts in both cases
and only accepts when the inventory is d1 but not d1 − 1. In the first case,
it becomes
E1,t[v1(t+ 1, d1 − 1, s− ej + e1)]− E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1 − 2, s− ej + e1)].
Then the inequality follows from the condition that the seller accepts when
the inventory and history is (d1 − 1, s − ej). In the second case, both the
LHS and RHS become p. Now for the event Πj , again, the one non-trivial
case is similar. Hence, the LHS becomes,
E1,t[v1(t+ 1, d1, s+ ej)]− E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1 − 1, s+ ej + e1)]
≥ E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1, s)]− E1,t[v1(t + 1, d1 − 1, s+ e1)],
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and the inequality thus follows by induction.
This concludes the proof. 
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